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Abstract
We use laboratory experiments to evaluate the effects of cognitive stress on in-
ventory management decisions in a finite horizon Economic Order Quantity (EOQ)
model. We manipulate two sources of cognitive stress. First, we vary participants’
ability to order inventory from any decision period to only when inventory is de-
pleted. This reduces cognitive stress by restricting the policy choice set. Second we
vary participants’ participation in a competing pin memorization. This increases
cognitive load. Participants complete a sequence of five “annual” inventory man-
agement tasks, with monthly ordering decisions. Both sources of cognitive stress
negatively impact earnings, with the bulk of these impacts occurring in the first
year. Participants’ choices in all treatments exhibit trends to near optimal policy
adoption. But only in the most favorable treatment do the majority of choices
reach the optimal policy. We estimate the learning dynamics of monthly order
decisions using a Markov switching model. Estimates suggest increased cognitive
load reduces the probability of switching to more profitable policies, and that more
complex policy choice sets leads to a greater policy lock-in. Our results suggests
that inexperienced individuals will perform more poorly when called upon to make
inventory management situations in cognitively stressfully environments, and that
the benefits of providing support and task simplicity is greatest when the task is
first assigned.
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1 Introduction
Best inventory management practices call for the solution of dynamic optimization prob-
lems. This requires inventory managers to parse complex sets of alternative solutions
and to use their short-term memory to hold and process information about the past,
present, and future values of key variables. Current workplace trends impose increas-
ing demands upon these managers’ cognitive resources (Ruderman et al., 2017). Some
examples of these trends are increasing complexity of supply chains (Bode and Wagner,
2015), increasing rates and scale of natural disasters and global social upheavals. We
assess how increasing cognitive stress through the complexity of the inventory policy
choice set and the competition for inventory managers’ cognitive resources impacts their
decision-making quality.
An extensive literature shows that, even under the best of circumstances, individuals sys-
tematically make suboptimal inventory management decisions. Decision-making biases
and strategic considerations are often key factors diminishing individual performances in
these tasks. When managing the inventory of a perishable good with uncertain demand,
i.e. the newsvendor problem, decision makers neither follow the optimal risk neutral or
averse policies consistently in experimental studies.1 When there is a multi-level supply
chain for a non-perishable good and certain demand, participants generate large bullwhip
effects in beer game experiments. Researcher have shown key factors driving the exces-
sive inventory levels and variance include strategic uncertainty regarding other decision
makers (Croson et al., 2014), limited level two thinking (Narayanan and Moritz, 2015)
and failure to fully take account of the future deliveries of past orders. In the setting
of a durable good with uncertain demand optimal inventory management follows the
(S, s) policy. Recent experimental studies by (Magnani et al., 2016; Khaw et al., 2017)
demonstrate that individuals take time to find the optimal policy, their policy adapta-
tions are idiosyncratic and often participants abandon the optimal policy once found.
Despite all being important inventory management environments, none are ideal to be-
gin an evaluation of how cognitive stress diminishes decision-making quality. The reason
being decision-makers’ performances are already suboptimal in their respective baseline
experimental conditions.
A more suitable inventory management environment should have two properties: the
optimal policy is invariant to a decision maker’s individual preferences and the majority
of decision makers can find the optimal policy under baseline conditions. The finite
horizon deterministic economic order quantity environment (EOQ) potentially possesses
these properties. Despite being one of the most commonly used models in operations
management, behavioral studies have mostly overlooked it. We choose the parameters of
1See Katok et al. (2011) for an introduction and partial survey of this literature.
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our environment such that the optimal inventory policy of the finite horizon matches that
of the infinite horizon; when inventory is depleted, the manager orders an optimal quantity
that is the multiple of the monthly demand for the good (Schwarz, 1972). We refer to this
multiple as an EOQ cycle length. This EOQ environment has several favourable features
for our research question: inexperienced participants have a relatively good chance of
finding the optimal policy; the solution is invariant to a decision maker’s risk attitude;
and, it is an individual decision problem absent of strategic considerations.
The EOQ solution in our environment is dynamic, as the manager doesn’t make the same
decision at each point in time. This gives us an opportunity to observe pure learning be-
havior in a dynamic programming problem. Our baseline environment provides the most
favourable circumstance for inexperienced participants to learn and follow the optimal
EOQ policy. The key elements of this baseline case is that we forbid participants from
ordering when there is a positive level of inventory - we call this our “EOQ” treatment
- and that there is no other tasks competing for the participants’ short term memory
resources - we call this our “Low” treatment. The majority of participants exposed to
this EOQ-Low base level of cognitive stress optimally solve this problem after several
“repetitions” of the finite horizon.
From the academic perspective, examining the EOQ environment is a first step in a longer
research agenda. However our results still provide managerial insights for a set of prac-
tical problems. Individuals without inventory management experience are often called
upon to perform such duties; we call these individuals “accidental” inventory managers.
Effective inventory management of relief supplies is a key driver of successful response
efforts in the aftermath of natural disasters. Two challenges commonly arising are the
associated increases in cognitive stress levels and the enlistment of accidental inventory
managers. In the ensuing rescue efforts to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, inexperienced
volunteers and government were deputized into inventory managerial roles. During the
rescue, excess supplies were delivered to the devastated area due to mismanagement.
This led to warehouse overflows and subsequent safety hazards. Similarly, in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 FEMA and state workers testified that they found their sup-
ply chains unable deliver the requested levels of goods, and in response they would order
twice as much as needed. In the article “Hurricane Katrina showed importance of logis-
tics” in Supply & Demand Chain Executive (2005) it was reported that Wal-Mart, the
world’s largest multinational retail corporation outperformed the inexperienced inventory
managers from FEMA and Red Cross.
Around our EOQ-Low baseline we implement a 2×2 experimental design with two factors
that exogenously impose cognitive stress. The first factor we investigate is the complex-
ity of the inventory policies choice set a participant chooses from. In contrast to our
EOQ treatment, participants in our “Unrestricted” treatment are allowed to place orders
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each month regardless of the current inventory level. A growing and recent literature in
economics, e.g. Caplin et al. (2011); Masatlioglu et al. (2012); Abeler and Ja¨ger (2015);
Lleras et al. (2017), examines and measures how individual choices are increasingly sub-
optimal as their choice sets increase in complexity. In our experimental design the policy
choice set of our Unrestricted treatment corresponds to the typical case of an unsupported
inventory manager while the simpler choice set of the EOQ treatment corresponds to ac-
tive management intervention. This allows our experiment to provide evidence on the
value of this practice.
The second factor we investigate is the presence of a concurrent task that competes for
the inventory manager’s cognitive resources. This concurrent task is the memorization of
a PIN code at the beginning of each inventory year, and successful recall at the end of the
year earns a monetary reward. We call this our “High” treatment. The PIN task was first
introduced by Miller (1956), and has been successively used in economics and psychology
to exogenously shock cognitive load. Some recent examples of its application are in food
choice (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999), generosity (Roch et al., 2000) and intertemporal
choice (Hinson et al., 2003). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use
this technique in behavioral operations management. Correspondingly this allows our
experiment to evaluate the impact of asking inexperienced inventory managers to multi-
task.
Our results show that experimental participants earn less when there is a competing
task or when the policy choice set is not restricted. We observe there is a trend that
participants learned to adopt near optimal EOQ policies in general. The restriction of
managers to only place orders when inventories are exhausted and the alleviation of
the competing task improved the chance for inexperienced decision makers to reach the
optimal inventory policy. It should be noted that these performance differences and
suboptimal choices largely occur in the first three iterations of our environment. The
inexperienced participants learn to better solve the dynamic optimization problem, we
attempt to characterize this learning.
We formulate the learning process as a decision tree in which participants, mainly those
in the Unresticted treatment, learn to avoid choices leading to stock outs and other
choices leading to carrying excess inventories. We find that iterations of the task quickly
diminish the probability of making such choices and, surprisingly, imposing high cognitive
loads doesn’t affect these probabilities. Once participants follow the branch to take EOQ
policy consistent actions we model the number of monthly demand orders requested, the
EOQ cycle length, using a Markov switching model (Shachat and Zhang, 2017) that is
particularly well suited for choice sequences made with low levels of rationality. Our
estimates of the model suggests that under high cognitive load participants are less likely
to choose payoff increasing EOQ cycle lengths. The estimates also suggest that with the
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more complicated policy choice sets of the Unrestricted treatment participants are more
reluctant to make large changes in EOQ cycle length leading to greater policy lock-in.
Our study is one of the first to experimentally examine a stationary limited horizon EOQ
model. But there are two previous studies which examine other EOQ environments.
The EOQ is one of the three environments Stangl and Thonemann (2017) consider in
their behavioral study of inventory decision-making under two common alternative frames
of performance measurement: inventory turnover and the number of days of inventory
held. The former leads managers to over-value inventory reductions relative to the latter.
Chen and Wu (2017) examine learning in an infinite EOQ environment in which there is
varying inventory ordering and holding costs. The experiment consists of fifty rounds of
such inventory decisions. For the first fifteen rounds operational costs were constant, and
they varied during the last thirty-five rounds. Their result shows that learning occurs
over rounds, and participants learn much faster about the optimal choice under stable
environment than under changing environment. Suboptimal decisions tend not to be
repeated with deterministic feedbacks. It is important to note that their participants’
choice sets are even more restricted than those of our EOQ treatment. Participants are
required to choose from an EOQ restricted choice set whose elements are the number of
weeks, their periodicity of demand, of inventory ordered each time inventory is depleted.
Thus, their policy choice set consists only of EOQ policies with fixed EOQ cycle lengths.
The feedback Chen and Wu (2017) provide participants is the average operational costs
generated per week by their EOQ cycle length choice, and participants’ reward metrics
are the sum of their average weekly performances. While we provide a monthly reported
feedback on each decision made, participants experience and collect rewards on a month-
to-month basis, which will vary from months when inventory is ordered to those when it
is not.
2 Experiment
2.1 Inventory decision task
In the core decision-making part of our experiment, participants complete a series of six
discrete dynamic inventory management tasks. We refer to each tasks as a year, indexed
zero to five, and each year consists of twelve months, indexed by t. We use the following
context to describe these tasks to a participant.
The participant manages the enterprise ‘S-store’ which sells coffee makers at a price of
7 per unit with a constant demand rate (D) of 10 units per month. S-store sells a new
model of coffee makers every year. Coffee maker orders are placed prior to the start of a
month, an integer amount denoted qt, and arrive without lag. Hence are included in the
5
calculation of a month’s opening inventory. The participant chooses the quantity of each
monthly order.
Monthly orders and demand determine the changing inventory levels. Let It denote the
closing inventory for month t. The initial inventory of coffee makers prior to month one
is zero, so the first month’s opening inventory is the amount of the first month’s coffee
maker order, i.e. I0 + q1 = q1. In general, the opening inventory of coffee makers in
month t is It−1 + qt. This inventory is drawn down by the monthly sales, the lesser of
the monthly order flow of 10 or the opening inventory (i.e. a stock out.) This results in
the closing inventory of It = It−1 + qt − min{10, It−1 + qt}. When the model life cycle
concludes at the end of month 12, any remaining inventory is disposed at no cost nor
generates but also generates no revenue. Further, we limit a participant’s monthly order
by its annual demand, i.e., qt ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 120}.
A participant’s compensation, excluding a fixed show-up fee, is proportional to S-store’s
profits, which are expressed - as are all further monetary quantities - in experiment
currency units (denoted ). Each coffee maker sells at a price of 7. So revenue in
month t is 7 · min{10, It−1 + qt}. S-store’s cost has two component’s: a fixed ordering
cost, S, of 45 whenever she places a strictly positive order; and a variable monthly
inventory holding cost. The monthly inventory holding costs is calculated by multiplying
the average inventory of coffee makers held in t, specifically (It−1+qt+It)
2
, and the monthly
holding cost, h, of 1 per unit. The monthly profit of S-store is the difference between
the revenue and costs, and is calculated
pit(qt, It−1) =
7 · 10− S · 1qt>0 −
It−1+qt+It
2
· 1 if It−1 + qt ≥ 10
7 · (It−1 + qt)− S · 1qt>0 − It−1+qt2 · 1 if It−1 + qt < 10
where, 1 is the indicator function.
A participant i’s inventory policy for year a is the sequence of the twelve monthly quantity
orders, Qi,a = (qi,1, qi,2, . . . , qi,12). For a given inventory policy S-store’s annual profits
are,
Πi,a(Qi,a) =
12∑
t=1
pit.
In the supply chain literature, the set of EOQ policies is the subset of inventory policies
which only place a quantity order once inventory reaches zero with no stock outs allowed.
In our dynamic decision making environment, stock outs can occur if a non-optimal
policy was chosen previously. Correspondingly we adjust the definition of an EOQ policy
to classify choices at these points off the optimal path.
Definition 1. An EOQ action is a temporal inventory management decision satisfying
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the following conditions:
(1). A participant only orders when the closing inventory of the previous period is less
than 10 units, i.e., qt > 0 when It−1 < 10;
(2). A participant doesn’t order when the closing inventory of the previous period is more
than 10 units, i.e., qt = 0 when It−1 ≥ 10;
(3). Participant’s order guarantees no stock outs in t, i.e., It−1 + qt ≥ 10.
Definition 2. An EOQ policy is a inventory management policy that consists only of
EOQ actions.
The original EOQ model solution is derived assuming an infinite demand horizon, in which
the average cost minimizing EOQ policy is to order the following quantity whenever the
closing inventory of the previous period is zero,
q∗ =
√
2DS
12h
. (1)
If our context then the cost minimizing policy would be to order 30 coffee makers, an
EOQ cycle length of three months, whenever closing inventory of the previous period is
zero. This would also be the profit maximizing policy as average revenue is constant, up
to the monthly demand capacity, and greater than the minimum average cost. In our
finite horizon setting the optimal policy does not change. But if an inventory manager
deviates from this policy early in the year the optimal course can involve alternative EOQ
actions later in the year.
Schwarz (1972) characterizes the optimal EOQ policies for the finite horizon of T months.
First, we note the result that average total cost minimizing policy is to order according
to Equation 1 if T is an integer multiple of the
q∗
D
. As simply following the EOQ policy
of ordering 10 units each period is profitable in our environment, profit maximization
will call for satisfying the full annual demand. The EOQ policy of always taking the
EOQ action of 30 when inventory is depleted maximizes profit in addition to minimizing
average cost.
As individuals can and do fail to act sub-optimally we now consider alternative, i.e.
shorter in this case, decision horizons. Let C(T ) be total incremental cost over the
finite time interval T . We restrict our attention to policies which only place orders when
inventory is zero. An EOQ cycle length is the interval of months between such orders,
denoted by sk, which is the interval between the (k − 1)th and the kth order. Let C(sk)
be the total incremental cost for an EOQ cycle, and n be the number of orders over T .
We can formulate the problem as
min C(T ) =
n∑
k=1
C(sk) s.t.
n∑
k=1
sk = T
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where
C(sk) = S + hDt
2/2
From the quadratic formulation, it is clear that in the optimal solution all of the sk are of
the same length. An EOQ constant inventory policy, denoted Q¯sk , is one with a constant
cycle length.
Let Cn(T ) be the total incremental cost for the interval T given n orders,
Cn(T ) = nS + hDT 2/2n.
Minimising Cn(T ) gives
n∗ =
√
hDT 2
2S
.
Notice for the first year in our task, i.e. T = 12, this yields the same solution as the
infinite horizon formulation, n∗ = 4 and t∗ = 3. Further investigations on situations when
the horizon T is sufficiently small reveals that The optimal number of orders, n∗, is the
smallest integer satisfying n(n+ 1) ≥ hDT
2
2S
.
With the parameter values in our task, the following table gives an overview of the optimal
solutions for different values of T :
Table 1: Optimal solutions for different T in our task
Month T
hDT 2
2S
n∗(n∗ + 1)
The optimal
order number
(n∗)
The optimal EOQ
cycle length (s∗k) se-
quence
12 1 0.111 2 1 {1}
11 2 0.444 2 1 {2}
10 3 1 2 1 {3}
9 4 1.778 2 1 {4}
8 5 2.778 6 2 {3, 2}
7 6 4 6 2 {3, 3}
6 7 5.444 6 2 {3, 4}
5 8 7.111 12 3 {3, 3, 2}
4 9 9 12 3 {3, 3, 3}
3 10 11.111 12 3 {3, 3, 4}
2 11 13.444 20 4 {3, 3, 3, 2}
1 12 16 20 4 {3, 3, 3, 3}
With our finite horizon of one year, the following set of constant EOQ cycles sk =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12} and the corresponding constant EOQ policies are of particular interest.
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Table 2 shows for these EOQ constant policies the corresponding annual profits, the num-
ber of orders placed annually and the percentage of maximum potential annual profits,
i.e. efficiency. Notice that EOQ constant 2 and 4 both generate over 93% of the potential
annual profits. Given the minimal loss incurred by adopting these policies we define an
alternative decision quality benchmark. When a participant chooses sk = {2, 4} we call
this “near optimal” performance.
Table 2: Alternative EOQ constant strategies which do not generate stock-outs or positive
closing inventories in month 12 and their respective performance properties.
Q¯sk
Orders
per year
Profit per
EOQ cycle
Annual profit Efficiency
12 1 75 75 15.63%
6 2 195 390 81.25%
4 3 155 465 96.88%
3 4 120 480 100.00%
2 6 75 450 93.75%
1 12 20 240 50.00%
2.2 Experimental design
Our experimental design has two treatment variables, each of which has two categories.
This generates a 2×2 factorial experimental design. We adopt a between subject design,
a participant only experiences one of the four possible treatment cells.
The first treatment variable is the feasible set of inventory policies a participant can
follow. The first category is called “Unrestricted” where a participant can choose any
quantity they wish each month as long as the quantity does not exceed 120. The second
category is called “EOQ”, where participants are restricted to ordering only once the
inventory level is zero. We expect that the larger set of alternatives in the unrestricted
category presents participants with a more difficult learning task.
The second treatment variable is the level of exogenous cognitive load burden we induce by
introducing a competing task. In the “Low” cognitive load category participants complete
the inventory tasks without distractions. In the “High” cognitive load we introduce an
incentivized PIN task that is completed along side the inventory management task and
requires the utilization of short term memory. At the start of each year a participant is
given 15 seconds to memorise a random 6-digit PIN. The PIN is case sensitive, consisting
of numbers, upper and lower case letters. After the completion of the year, a participant
is prompted to enter the PIN. Entering the correct PIN unlocks an extra reward of 300.
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A participants only has one attempt at the PIN task. If a participant actively tries to
complete the PIN task successfully we expect the diminished access to short term memory
to reduce decision making quality and the speed of any learning.
Table 3 summarizes our experimental design and provides summary statistics on the
demographics of the participants. We designate treatment cells by the word pairs x -y,
where x is feasible set of policies category and y is category of the cognitive load.
Table 3: Summary of the demographic information of participants for each treatment
Treatment cell Paticipants
Average
age
Male Postgrad
STEM
subjects1
Average math
level2
EOQ-Low 39 25 23% 47% 34% 3.26
EOQ-High 36 28 50% 56% 28% 3.53
Unrestricted-Low 41 25 34% 49% 37% 3.68
Unrestricted-High 41 25 37% 44% 56% 3.20
1 STEM subjects include Engineering & Technology, Life Sciences & Medicine and Natural
Sciences. Non-STEM subjects include Arts & Humanities and Social Sciences & Management.
2 Math Level was self-assessed, and was categorised into 6 levels. 1 = “Below GCSE”, 2 =
“GCSE”, 3 = “A-Levels”, 4 = “Undergraduate”, 5 = “Postgraduate”, 6 = “Above Postgradu-
ate”.
2.3 Experimental procedures
Seven sessions were conducted at Newcastle University Business School experimental eco-
nomics laboratory during May and July 2017. 162 participants2 were recruited via random
selection for invitation from a participant pool database of the Behavioural Economics
Northeast Cluster. All participants were students from Newcastle University except for
three who were from Northumbria University.
Each session lasted no more than sixty minutes, with strict procedures to limit the access
to any aides that would provide assistance in calculations or remembering PIN codes.
Participants were signed in individually and instructed to leave their personal belong-
ings, including any writing instruments, in the reception area before being escorted to
a computer desk placed in a privacy carrel. Each participant was then provided with a
2 We excluded five participants from our data analysis and the participant counts given in Table 3.
One participant, in the EOQ-Low treatment, always submitted the random slider starting position when
inventory reached zero. Two other participants, in the EOQ-High treatment, grossly took advantage of
the limited liability rule. The final two excluded participants attended the last session and demonstrated
behaviour that they had been briefed about the content of the experiment; they clicked through the
instructions without reading them and subsequently provided the solution Q¯3 for all years - even though
this was not optimal for the practice year.
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pen and two copies of an informed consent document, which they read and signed if they
wished to continue their participation. The pen and signed forms were then collected by
a monitor. After which participants were sternly informed that no electronic devices -
such as mobile phones, calculator, smart watches, etc. - could be used until their session
was completed. They were further instructed that the rest of the experimental tasks were
fully computerized and they would complete the rest of the experiment only using their
mouse. Prior to participants entering the laboratory, all computer keyboards were con-
cealed under a thick opaque cover. This was to done to diminish any access to mnemonic
devices for remembering PIN codes. These measures were taken in all sessions to provide
control between High and Low cognitive load treatments.
The experiment itself was conducted using a self-contained program developed in oTree
(Chen et al., 2016). Access was restricted to other programs on the computer. The
sum of these measures eliminated many of the tools participants commonly used to per-
form mathematical calculations. This dismal work environment was applied to all four
treatment cells.
Once instructed to start by the monitor, participants read through the instructions3 at
their own pace. After reading the instructions, participants were asked to complete seven
multiple choice questions designed to ensure that they understand the calculation of costs
and profits. Participants who provided more than two incorrect answers had to review
the mistaken questions with one of the experimenters before proceeding to the decision
tasks.
Participants then participated in the six year decision task sequence, followed by a short
post-experiment survey which collected demographic information. Year 0 was a practice
round which used an alternative set of cost parameters4 from those of Years 1 through
5, and the performance in this task did not affect a participant’s total earnings. The
purpose of the practice year was to help familiarize the participants with the task and
the decision screen. Orders were entered by moving a slider whose value range was zero
to one hundred and twenty. The initial point of the slider was random each month, and in
the case of an EOQ treatment with a positive starting inventory it was greyed out. The
decision screen included a table providing the entire history of a participant’s monthly
ordering choices, as well as opening inventory, units sold, closing inventory, sales revenue,
ordering costs, holding costs and profits.5 For participants who experienced the High
cognitive load treatment, we provided an opportunity to practice the PIN task in the
practice Year.
Participants then completed the Years 1 through 5 decision tasks. Participants were paid
3In the first Appendix, we provide a complete set of instructions.
4 In the practice year the order costs were 45 and the holding costs were 0.5.
5 We provide screen captures of these interfaces in the Appendices.
11
for their accumulated earnings from these decision tasks, at the conversion rate of 300
= £1, as well as a £5 show-up fee. There was limited liability; to ensure the motivation
to make profits would not be affected by a large negative earnings made in a particular
year, any negative profits made in a year will be treated as 0 earnings.6 The average
earnings were £13.37 per participant, including the participation fee.
One last important aspect of the experiment was the fixed length of time a participant had
to complete the inventory management task for a year. We required that a participant
spend exactly four minutes completing each task in Years 1 through 5. This was designed
to prevent participants from racing through the monthly decisions in order to reduce the
cognitive cost of remembering their PIN. If a participant completed their twelve monthly
decisions early they could not advance to the next period (or enter the PIN) until the
four minutes expired. If they failed to complete the twelve tasks before the time expired,
the computer program executed the remaining months sales with the existing inventory
stock.
3 Empirical evaluation of treatment effects
We evaluate the treatment effects of restricted inventory policy choice sets and increased
cognitive load by considering their impacts upon participant’s earnings in the inventory
management tasks, the propensity to choose optimal inventory policies, and then the
efficacy of the PIN task and whether performance in that task is correlated with inventory
performance.
3.1 Hypotheses
Our motivation of treatment variables leads to several natural hypotheses. Increases in
cognitive load reduces short term memory capacity and lead to diminished performance
in both the EOQ and Unrestricted policy choice sets, giving the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Average annual earnings are greater in the EOQ-Low treatment than the
EOQ-High treatment, as well as in the Unrestricted-Low treatment versus Unrestricted-
High treatment.
As suggested by the number of alternative EOQ constant policies which generate near
optimal performance levels, we suggest the following hypothesis may be less likely to
confirm:
Hypothesis 2. The percentage of participants who adopt optimal (near-optimal) inven-
tories is greater in the EOQ-Low treatment than the EOQ-High treatment, as well as in
the Unrestricted-Low treatment versus Unrestricted-High treatment.
6 This limited liability only affected the earnings of five participants in five different years.
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The set of inventory policies in the unrestricted is much larger than and only adds subop-
timal alternatives to the EOQ restricted set of policy choices. The reducing the focalness
of EOQ strategies and greatly complicating participants’ choice sets in the Unrestricted
treatments leads to our next set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. Average annual earnings are greater in the EOQ-High treatment than the
Unrestricted-High treatment, as well as in the EOQ-Low treatment versus Unrestricted-
Low treatment.
Hypothesis 4. The percentage of participants who adopt optimal (near-optimal) inven-
tories is greater in the EOQ-High treatment than the Unrestricted-High treatment, as well
as in the EOQ-Low treatment versus Unrestricted-Low treatment.
3.2 Annual inventory profits
We test the differences in average annual profit for different treatment groups using two-
sided t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. We report the results of these
hypotheses tests in Table 4. The first two rows indicate that both giving participants
unrestricted policy choices and shocking their cognitive load each negatively impact av-
erage annual profits both statistically and economically. More complicated policy choices
cause more profit loss than High cognitive load.
When we examine the effect of exogenously increasing a participant’s cognitive load
conditional on the policy choice set we find mixed support for Hypothesis 1. There is a
statistically significant reduction in average in earnings in the EOQ treatment, but not in
the Unrestricted treatment. We do find stronger evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, as
we find limiting participant’s choices to EOQ restricted policies does lead to statistically
greater average earnings in both Low and High cognitive load settings.
A disaggregated view of the average annual profits permit insights into learning over time
and how our treatments impact it. Figure 1 presents these time trends for each of the
four treatments. There are several prominent features of this figure which provide refined
insights into our hypotheses results on the average profit levels. First, performance gains
are mostly achieved in Years 1 through 3. Second, average earnings are around 90% of
the possible earnings in the last two years; except for the Unrestricted-High treatment
which are around 5-10% lower. Third, High cognitive load and Unrestricted policy choice
sets both cause the greatest negative performance impact in Year 1.
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Table 4: Average annual profits by treatment and hypotheses tests for differences in
average annual earnings
Panel A: Annual profits by treatment
EOQ-Low EOQ-High Unrestricted-Low Unrestricted-High
Average 412.94 390.10 375.85 366.70
Stand. Dev. 97.35 113.78 129.38 126.87
Panel B: Hypotheses tests for differences in average annual profits (p-values reported)
Treatment Comparison Difference Profit loss
(%)
Two-sided
t-tests
Wilcoxon
rank-sum
EOQ vs Unrestricted 30.71 7.64% 0.000 0.001
Low vs High 16.29 4.14% 0.055 0.003
EOQ-Low vs EOQ-High 22.84 5.53% 0.038 0.012
Unrestricted-Low vs Unrestricted-High 9.15 2.43% 0.470 0.124
EOQ-Low vs Unrestricted-Low 37.09 8.98% 0.001 0.012
EOQ-High vs Unrestricted-High 23.40 6.00% 0.059 0.052
Figure 1: Annual Profits over individual Years and by treatment: Averages and 95%
confidence intervals
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We quantify and assess these remarks by conducting a series of dummy variable linear
regressions using robust standard errors. We report these results in Table 5. In model
(1), we simply regress annual profit on a constant and dummy variables for Years 1
through 4, rendering Year 5 the base level. In model (2) we introduce dummy variables
for the Unrestricted and High treatment categories. In this case the constant reflects
the average profit level for Year 5 in the EOQ-Low treatment; and the Year 1 through
4 dummy variable coefficients reflect the average annual profits across participants in
the EOQ-Low treatment. In the model (3), we add interaction dummy variables for the
Unrestricted and High treatment categories to examine if their joint imposition leads to
super- or sub-additive impact on annual profit.
Our treatment effects for Unrestricted and High are largely generated by their Year 1
impacts as seen by their individually significant coefficients in models (2) and (3). We
conduct a Chow, F -tests, for which the null is model (1) versus the alternative of model
(2), i.e. the joint differences of the two treatments are significant. The resulting F -stat
is 3.09, the degrees of freedom are (10, 770), and has a p-value of 0.001. We conduct
a second F -tests to compare the veracity of model (3) versus model (2). The resulting
F -stat in this case is 1.14, the degrees of freedom are (5, 765), and has a p-value of 0.336.
Our analyses of annual profits leads us to our first set of results.
Result 1. Reducing the participants’ policy choice sets to EOQ restricted ones leads to
higher profits. However, these gains predominantly occur in Year 1 - when the participants
face the inventory decision problem for the first time.
Result 2. Exogenously increasing participants’ cognitive load leads to lower profits. How-
ever, these losses predominantly occur in Year 1 - when the participants face the inventory
decision problem for the first time.
Result 3. There is no super- or sub-additive effect of simultaneously exposing participants
to the Unrestricted and High treatment categories.
3.3 Inventory management policy choices
We turn our analysis towards the inventory policy choices of participants. For each
participant we evaluate each of the annual inventory policies, Qi,a, for whether it is
optimal, Q¯3, or if its near-optimal, and EOQ constant strategy of either Q¯2 or Q¯4 .
Figure 2 depicts the evolution across years of the percentages of participants following
optimal and near-optimal policies in each treatment. Inspection of this figure reveals our
next set of results.
Result 4. There is a trend in all treatments for increasing use of optimal and near-
optimal policies from Year 1 to Year 4.
Result 5. High cognitive loads leads to lower percentage use of these policies for both
EOQ and Unrestricted in all five Years.
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Table 5: Dummy variable regressions for annual profit. (n=785)
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy Variable Annual Profit Annual Profit Annual Profit
Year 1 -112.27∗∗∗ -67.35∗∗∗ -57.22∗∗∗
(12.80) (18.85) (20.12)
Unrestricted·Year 1 -45.45∗ -65.22∗∗
(24.64) (31.90)
High·Year 1 -43.20∗ -64.31∗
(24.86) (33.32)
Unrestricted·High·Year 1 40.40
(49.55)
Year 2 -73.39∗∗∗ -71.29∗∗∗ -73.36∗∗∗
(12.12) (20.57) (23.70)
Unrestricted·Year 2 -11.56 -7.53
(23.99) (34.78)
High·Year 2 8.04 12.35
(24.15) (31.31)
Unrestricted·High·Year 2 -8.24
(48.05)
Year 3 -38.81∗∗∗ -54.99∗∗∗ -33.27∗∗
(10.00) (15.69) (16.84)
Unrestricted·Year 3 16.24 -26.15
(20.08) (28.67)
High·Year 3 15.70 -29.56
(20.12) (27.46)
Unrestricted·High·Year 3 86.59∗∗
(39.79)
Year 4 -12.85 -4.49 -1.33
(8.47) (12.33) (13.05)
Unrestricted·Year 4 -15.59 -21.75
(16.38) (22.47)
High·Year 4 -0.45 -7.03
(16.69) (18.27)
Unrestricted·High·Year 4 12.59
(32.88)
Unrestricted -19.12∗ -12.96
(10.29) (13.84)
High -11.70 -5.13
(10.42) (12.80)
Unrestricted·High -12.58
(20.65)
Constant 433.40∗∗∗ 449.13∗∗∗ 445.97∗∗∗
(5.27) (8.68) (9.89)
R2 0.12 0.16 0.16
F -statistic 26.02∗∗∗ 10.34∗∗∗ 7.82∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4 Efficacy of the PIN reward procedure
Next we evaluate the efficacy of procedure for exogenously increasing the cognitive load.
Our experimental design faces a challenging balancing act. If the PIN reward procedure is
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Figure 2: Stacked graph of the percentage of participants following optimal and near-
optimal EOQ constant strategies: by Year and treatment
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too simple participants will always collect the reward utilizing minimal short run memory
resources, and if it is too difficult they could either decide to forgo the mental costs
of trying to commit the PIN to short term memory or forgo effort in the Inventory
management tasks. A second concern is that raw intelligence is an omitted variable
in our analysis which would manifest itself in a strong positive correlation between a
participant’s performances in the PIN reward and the Inventory management task.
We provide visual evidence that our design successfully addresses this balancing act in
Figure 3. First, we observe that only three out of the seventy-seven participants earned
one or less PIN rewards; and at the same time thirty-three out of seventy-seven collected
all five pin rewards. Second, there doesn’t appear to be a clustering of poor Inventory
management performers, below the ad hoc threshold of 1500, on high or low numbers
of earned PIN rewards. Third, there is little evident differences in the conditional means
of total profits - suggesting the PIN and inventory management tasks performance are
independent.
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Figure 3: Participants’ total inventory management task profits conditional on the num-
ber of PIN rewards earned and the corresponding whisker plots for the 50, 75, and 95%
quantiles. The numbers across the top are the counts of participants who earned the
corresponding number of PIN rewards.
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We quantify the evidence of the independence of PIN and Inventory management task
performance by statistically measuring their correlation and testing its statistical signif-
icance. Table 6 reports these correlations and the p-values of the hypotheses tests that
the correlation is zero. The left portion of the table addresses the correlation between
the success of a PIN reward task and the corresponding annual inventory profit. The
evidence is mixed. We don’t find correlations significantly different from zero in four
out of five years, but do find a highly significant positive correlation when we pool all
of the years. This analysis suggests potential positive correlation between a correct PIN
tasks and individual reward; however this analysis does not allowing for differences in
participants’ performances for the PIN task. To address this concern we evaluate the
correlations between the total number of PIN rewards earned by a participant j and both
j’s annual profits and her total Inventory tasks profit. We report these correlations in the
right side of Table 6. In this analysis we find evidence in favor of no correlation. None of
these correlations is significant.
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Table 6: Spearman correlations between PIN reward earned in Year a by participant j
and j’s corresponding Inventory task profit; Spearman and Pearson Rank correlations
between a participant j’s total number of earned PIN rewards and their Inventory task
profits
PIN reward eared in Year a Number of PIN reward earned
Spearman Rank Corr. Pearson Corr. Spearman Rank Corr.
Annual
Profit
Year 1 0.08 0.13 0.11
(0.512) (0.248) (0.324)
Year 2 0.12 0.08 0.11
(0.315) (0.507) (0.338)
Year 3 0.21 0.10 0.04
(0.072) (0.391) (0.750)
Year 4 0.09 0.15 0.04
(0.459) (0.182) (0.725)
Year 5 0.14 0.10 0.14
(0.226) (0.379) (0.218)
All Years 0.18 N/A N/A
(0.001) N/A N/A
Total Profit
N/A 0.179 0.182
N/A (0.120) (0.114)
1. The p-values of the respective tests are reported in the parenthesis.
2. We don’t report the correlations for Total Profit in column three because the calculation will
include multiple repetitions of a participant’s total inventory profit.
3. We don’t report the correlations for all Years in columns for and five because the calculation will
include multiple repetitions of a participant’s total number of PIN rewards.
4 Learning Dynamics
In our final analysis we present and estimate a Markovian learning model for participants’
monthly order choices. Avoiding stock out - thus not foregoing potential profit - and only
ordering when sales have exhausted inventory - thus avoiding excess holding costs - are
two key logical motivations for choosing EOQ consistent actions. We formulate a learning
process for monthly choices as a decision tree where the first branch is avoiding one of
these two pitfalls, and the second branch is the Markov process by which one chooses an
EOQ cycle when inventory reaches zero. Figure 4 depicts this process.
We will formulate the probabilities of choosing Non-EOQ actions as simple Logit functions
of time, habit formation and whether it is a High cognitive load treatment. As the
experimental design prunes Branch 1 for the EOQ treatment for the most part, of key
interest here is whether High cognitive load leads to larger probabilities of Non-EOQ
actions. Then when an individual chooses an order once inventory reaches zero, we use
a low rationality Markov model to specify how participants switch from one EOQ cycle
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Figure 4: The branching decision process. First, there is a choice of proceeding to Branch
1 and taking Non-EOQ action or Branch 2 and taking an EOQ action. This formulation
depends upon whether the closing inventory of previous period is greater or less than 10.
It−1 < 10
qt ≤ 10− It−1
Non-EOQ Action
EOQ cycle order
EOQ action
(a) Decision process when the closing in-
ventory of previous period is strictly less
than ten.
It−1 ≥ 10
qt > 0
Non-EOQ Action
qt = 0
EOQ action
(b) Decision process when the closing
inventory of previous period is greater
than ten.
length to another. In this model we examine the probability of switching to an at least
as profitable EOQ action and the viscosity to making large changes to EOQ cycle length.
4.1 Branch Decision 1
To investigate the factors that influence the probability of participants deviating from
an EOQ action in any one of the sixty decision rounds with financial incentives we first
define and indicator function for
NonEOQi,r =
1 if qi,r is not an EOQ action in decision round r, and0 otherwise.
where r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 60}.
We estimate sets of Logit regressions on the probability a participant chooses a NonEOQ
action for two cases; one when the previous month’s closing inventory is strictly less than
ten and one when it is at least ten. In both cases we consider the following specification
Pr(NonEOQi,r = 1) = F (β0 + β1Y earr + β2Monthr + β3High+ β4NonEOQACCi,r−1).
Here F is the logistic culmative distribution function and NonEOQACCi,r−1 is the total
number of rounds participant i has deviated from EOQ up through round r − 1 - this is
intended to capture any habit formation. Note this is a running count of an participant’s
NonEOQ actions in either state.
The Logit regression results are presented in Table 7: Panel A for the case It−1 < 10
and Panel B for the case It−1 ≥ 10. For the prior case, deviations from an EOQ action
occur due to the possibilities of stock outs. While our design was motivated to only allow
participants in the Unrestricted to make such NonEOQ actions, it may also happen in
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the EOQ treatment when a participant orders less than 10 when the closing inventory of
previous period is 0. There are only 40 such observations out of 4500, but we do include
these in the Panel A results.7 For the latter case - the closing inventory of previous
period is at least ten - the only possible deviation from an EOQ action is to order a
strictly positive amount, which is not allowed in the EOQ treatment group. For such
state only observations from the Unrestricted treatment groups are included.
Table 7: Logit regression on the probability of deviating from an EOQ action
Panel A: It−1 < 10 Panel B: It−1 ≥ 10
nonEOQi,r (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y earr -0.498
∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.128) (0.160) (0.096) (0.097) (0.134)
Monthr 0.194
∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.054) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
High 0.255 0.216 -0.404 -0.193
(0.425) (0.311) (0.376) (0.296)
NonEOQACCi,r−1 0.288∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040)
Constant -3.379∗∗∗ -3.507∗∗∗ -3.175∗∗∗ -1.754∗∗∗ -1.573∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗
(0.583) (0.630) (0.690) (0.338) (0.397) (0.430)
N 3032 3032 2875 3286 3286 3286
χ2 34.10∗∗∗ 36.06∗∗∗ 97.89∗∗∗ 22.66∗∗∗ 22.90∗∗∗ 75.76∗∗∗
Pr(NonEOQi,r) = 1 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.030
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
First, note the large negative values of the estimated coefficients pushing the argument of
the logistic CDF to its far left tail. Thus all estimated probabilities of NonEOQ actions are
small as indicated by the last row of the table which reports the estimated probability of
a NonEOQ action at the average level of the factors. Second, two significant factors, both
statistically and economically, are the number of years and the accumulation of experience
of choosing NonEOQ actions. The large estimated coefficient indicates there is significant
learning to choose EOQ actions across the five years. The positive estimated value of
the coefficient of NonEOQACCi,r−1 captures the individual differences in the epiphany
of the EOQ logic. The estimated coefficients for Months are statistically significant, but
have low magnitude in moving probabilities meaningfully are of opposite signs in two
cases. This suggests that stockouts are more likely later a year while ordering when
there is excess inventory is less likely later in a year. Surprisingly there is no significant
effect of having a high cognitive load on taking NonEOQ actions. Thus the performance
differences must come from the types of EOQ actions one takes under high cognitive load.
7Also there is another possible way to deviate from an EOQ action in the EOQ treatment. Participants
may have positive closing inventory of previous period that is less than 10 but are not allowed to place
order (138 out 4500 observations). We exclude these observations as they are not by choice.
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Overall we interpret this evidence that providing the more complicated choice set does
lead to some NonEOQ actions, but these choices diminish with experience.
4.2 Branch Decision 2: A Markov model of EOQ cycle choice
Once an EOQ action is taken, the second branches in Figure 4, we consider how the
participant chooses an EOQ cycle length. First, we make a slight modification to our
definition of an EOQ cycle to handle situations in the Unrestricted treatment when the
previous month’s closing inventory is strictly positive but strictly less than ten. Let
s˜i,k denotes the largest integer less than or equal to
It−1+qt
10
. To see how this change
of definition works consider the following simple example. If a participant has a closing
inventory of 2 units from previous period and orders 8 units, then s˜i,k = 1. Figure 5 shows
histograms of EOQ cycles choices using this new definition in both Unrestricted and EOQ
treatments. This figure illustrates that we see more of the typically optimal EOQ cycles
of length three in the EOQ treatment, and more extreme EOQ cycles of lengths one and
twelve in the Unrestricted treatment. Using the information of Figure 5 we move forward
considering the set of possible EOQ cycle length s˜i,k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}.8
Figure 5: EOQ cycle choice histograms for EOQ and Unrestricted treatments
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Proceeding to the dynamics of a participant’s sequence of EOQ cycle choices, we compare
the relative ranking of alternative EOQ cycles by their monthly average profit conditional
upon month. We denote this monthly average profit as p¯it(s˜i,k). Notice that the pay off
function depends upon t and will penalize relatively long EOQ cycles that generate excess
inventory at the year’s end. We report the values of p¯it(s˜i,k) in Table 8.
8Due to the low number of observations we round down EOQ cycles of s˜i,k = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11} to
s˜i,k = 6. Also, note that we are including s˜i,k = 5 as an EOQ choice cycle given the high frequency it is
chosen despite it not corresponding to a EOQ constant policy.
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Table 8: Average monthly profit for alternative EOQ cycle choice given the current month
s 1 2 3 4 5 6 121
Month 1-7 20 37.5 40 38.75 36 32.5 -
Month 8 20 37.5 40 38.75 36 26 -
Month 9 20 37.5 40 38.75 28.75 18.75 -
Month 10 20 37.5 40 30 20 10 -
Month 11 20 37.5 27.5 17.5 7.5 -2.5 -
Month 12 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -
1 s˜i,k = 12 always offers the lowest average monthly payoff
We use this measure to evaluate whether a participant’s EOQ cycle choice generates a
higher monthly average profit than their previous EOQ cycle choice. For each individual
we consider the proportions of transitions to higher, the same, and lower pforit cycles.
We plot these proportions by treatment cell in Figure 6 and sort individuals by the
proportion of ’better’ transitions. This figure illustrates that participants exhibit rather
limited individual rationality as their frequency of transitioning to a more profitable EOQ
cycle tend to only slightly exceed that of switching to a less profitable cycle. Further there
is a large amount of EOQ cycle choice repetition.
Figure 6: Proportions of Better, Same and Worse EOQ cycle transitions - ranked by
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For a situation in which individuals similarly do not find the subset of higher ranked
alternatives salient and there is an ordinal property - but not always monotonic in reward
- to the set of alternatives, Shachat and Zhang (2017) introduced a Markov model of
limited rationality to describe learning. We adapt that model for our setting. EOQ
cycle transitions probabilities are governed by a two-stage process. In the first stage,
probability is allocated between two subsets of possible EOQ cycles: NW, the subset
of EOQ cycles no worse than s˜i,k−1, and NB, the subset of EOQ cycles no better than
s˜i,k−1.9 Specifically,
NWt(s˜i,k−1) = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}|p¯it(j) ≥ p¯it(s˜i,k−1)}
NBt(s˜i,k−1) = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}|p¯it(j) ≤ p¯it(s˜i,k−1)}
NW and NB may not be mutually exclusive; they will share the previous choice of an
EOQ cycle when there are sufficient months remaining in the year. We assume that an
α measure of probability is allocated to the NW set and a 1− α measure of probability
is assigned to the NB set.
In the second stage, probability measure is allocated amongst the elements within each
of these subsets. Such allocation is allowed to reflect participants possibly favouring the
cycle having a smaller difference in length with the previous cycle. Specially, probability
is allocated according to the number of steps between an element and the previous cycle
length. The step count between EOQ cycle length j and j′ is defined as,
θ(j, j′) = |j − j′|+ 1.
A special case of j = 12 is treated as 2 steps from j′ = 6.
We use the following weighting function to determine an EOQ cycle’s assigned share of
probability measure,
w(j|s˜i,k−1, Z, λ) = θ(j, s˜i,k−1)
λ∑
j′∈Z θ(j
′, s˜i,k−1)λ
,∀j ∈ Z
in which Z is either the NW or NB subset. In the proportional assignment, λ ≤ 0
measures the strength of the bias for small changes within the subset Z. A decrease in
λ corresponds to a growing bias. We calculate the transition probability for each EOQ
9 These subsets change depending on which month the choice occurs due to finite horizon. For
instance, s˜i,k = 3 would be in NW subset of s˜i,k−1 = 1 in month 10, but will change to be in NB subset
in month 12. A detailed listing on NW and NB subsets for different month can be found in Appendix C.
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cycle by adding up the probability measures it is allocated from the NW and NB subsets,
Pr(s˜i,k = j|s˜i,k−1) = α× 1(j∈NWt(s˜i,k−1)) × w(j|s˜i,k−1, NWt(s˜i,k−1), λ)
+ (1− α)× 1(j∈NBt(s˜i,k−1)) × w(j|s˜i,k−1, NBt(s˜i,k−1), λ)
For example, if s˜i,3 = 1 and s˜i,4 = 3, the transition probability is α
3λ∑6
j=1 j
λ , while if
s˜i,11 = 1 and s˜i,12 = 3, the transition probability is (1− α) 3λ∑7
j=1 j
λ .
We estimate the two parameters of the Markov choice model for each treatment cell
by maximum likelihood estimation and present them in Table 9. In all treatments, the
magnitude of approximately 70% of α indicates that participants are more likely to move
into their current NW set. However, the ability to order in any month and introducing
cognitive load reduce the probability of switching to more profitable actions. The estimate
of λ is larger in magnitude for the Unrestricted treatments, indicating a larger bias for
small changes within the sets. The ability to order in any month leads to a greater
degree of action lock-in. However, the differences of the estimates of the parameters
are not statistically significant when we estimate these coefficients jointly and test for
differences using likelihood ratio tests - p-values are approximately 0.15 is each case.
Table 9: Parameter estimates for the Markov EOQ cycle choice model, standard errors
in parentheses
Parameter EOQ-Low EOQ-High Unrestricted-Low Unrestricted-High
α 0.760 0.712 0.708 0.676
(0.031) (0.032) (0.041) (0.040)
λ -0.709 -0.782 -1.104 -1.320
(0.178) (0.137) (0.217) (0.209)
Overall we find the Unrestricted treatment leads to a small percentage of Non-EOQ
actions, generating performance diminishing outcomes of excess inventories and stockouts.
However, we find the likelihood of these events diminish over time and is surprisingly
unaffected by high cognitive loads. The more complex choice sets of the Unrestricted
treatment also leads to more inertia in EOQ cycle length choices inducing choice lock-in.
This is a likely cause of participants choosing near rather than absolute optimal policies
in the last two years. This is a similar phenomenon found in Caplin et al. (2011); as
they increase choice set complexity participants tend to switch within a smaller range of
values.10 The effect of the High cognitive load is for participants to exhibit a lower level
of rationality once they choose EOQ actions; their probability of choosing EOQ cycles
10See their Figure 4: Average Value by Selection.
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that generate at least the same level of average monthly profit is lower than for those
participants who do not have the competing PIN memorization task.
5 Conclusion
We present an experimental investigation to assess the effect of cognitive stress on inven-
tory management decisions in an EOQ model. We exogenously impose cognitive stress
from two sources: increased complexity of the inventory policy choice set and increased
cognitive load from a PIN task that competes for the participants’ short term memory
resources. Both sources of cognitive stress negatively impact participants’ performance.
However, these negative impacts occur predominantly when participants first face the
inventory decision problem. While average performance is not statistically different, we
note that only in the EOQ-Low treatment cell do we observe the majority of participants
eventually learn to use the optimal EOQ policy. We model and then estimate partic-
ipants learning of monthly action choices using a Markovian learning framework. We
find that the availability of the more complicated choice set causes some deviations from
EOQ actions, but such deviations diminish with experience. Further, the ability to order
in any month leads to a greater degree of EOQ cycle length choice lock-in. Increased
cognitive load reduces the probability of switching to more profitable actions.
The EOQ is a prevalent tool of inventory managers in the field. Our results provide
managerial insights, particularly in the case of accidental or inexperienced inventory
managers. It is clear that asking such individuals to simultaneously complete other tasks
impedes their learning of effective inventory management. Further, there is value in
restricting the manager’s possible actions to those consistent with EOQ policies. Absent
this intervention, there is a greater chance of locking in suboptimal EOQ cycles. Of course,
in the long run we observe near identical performance with enough experience. But one
should proceed with caution thinking that good management will arise eventually with
experience; our environment is constant and certain. Chen and Wu (2017) demonstrated
that changing ordering and holding costs will slow the learning process.
We believe this is a successful first step in evaluating and developing interventions to
minimize the impact of cognitive stress on inventory management performance. Our ex
ante expectation was that cognitive load would have the more severe impact that would
manifest itself in more varied directions that choice set complexity. However, it does
appear that presentation of policies has the more complicated, and hence providing more
scope for intervention design, impact on the decision-making process. Some natural next
steps are to explore how the choice set complexity and corresponding framing impact
decision making in the other previously raised inventory management paradigms such as
the newsvendor problem, (S, s) inventory management, and multi-tiered supply chains.
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A Experiment Instructions and Interface
Instructions for different treatments are presented as the texts/sentences in italics and
square brackets below.
A.1 Instruction Page
Welcome
Welcome to today’s experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully as they
are directly relevant to how much money you will earn today. Please do not communicate
with other people during the experiment. Please note that you are not permitted to
use pen and paper or a mobile phone. Please kindly switch your mobile phone
off or put it on silent mode. Students causing a disturbance will be asked to leave the
room. You will enter all of your decisions in todays experiment using only the computer
mouse. Please do not attempt to use the keyboard or remove the keyboard cover. The
information displayed on your computer monitor is private and specific to you. All
monetary amounts in todays experiment are expressed as experimental currency units
(ECU). The conversion rate for ECU and GBP is 300 ECU = £1 cash payment. Your
payment will be rounded up to the nearest ten pence.
If you have any questions at any point during today’s session, please raise your hand and
one of the monitors will come to help.
Task
In todays experiment, you will be making inventory management decisions for an
enterprise called S-Store. S-Store sells coffee makers. You will perform this role for a
sequence of 6 years. Every month you will decide how many coffee makers to order from
the coffee maker supplier. Your earnings in this experiment will be proportional to the
total profitability of S-Store. S-store will sell a new coffee maker model every year. Thus
in the first month of a year your inventory always starts from zero. Further, any coffee
makers remaining in inventory at the end of month 12 will be disposed of. To summarise,
you will be making 12 monthly decisions for a year, and you will do this for 6 years in
total.
You will have up to 4 minutes to complete your task for each year. Year 1 is a practice
round, and you will have up to 7 minutes to complete the task for this year. You
should use this as an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the software and decision
tasks. If you dont finish within the time allowed, the computer will automatically execute
the remaining month(s) sales with the existing inventory. You will not be able to add
inventory. A ‘wait page’ displays automatically if you spend less than the allowed time
in a year. You will only be able to proceed to the next year when the remaining time
runs out.
Before the decision making portion of the experiment begins, there will be a Quiz con-
sisting of 7 simple questions to check your understanding of the task. Please answer the
questions carefully. If you missed 3 or more questions, you would be asked review the
correct answers before you can proceed to the task.
[The following italic texts are additional for treatments with High Cognitive Loads]
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PIN
In addition to the task, you will be given a 7-digit PIN at the beginning of each year. The
PIN is case sensitive, and consisting of numbers, uppercase and lowercase letters. You
will have 15 seconds to remember the PIN. This is your KEY to unlock an account which
contains an extra reward of 300 ECU. You can open the account at the end of each year
by correctly entering the PIN. You will only have one attempt to correctly enter the pin
to claim this extra reward.
Payment
Year 0 is a practice round, and you will receive no earnings from your decisions in this
year. For Years 1 through 5, your earnings will accumulate across years. At the end of
the experiment you will be paid £5 show-up fee and your accumulated earnings, converted
to Pounds. Note, negative profit may occur if poor coffee maker ordering decisions are
made. To ensure that no one will leave the experiment with a payment less than £5, a
negative total profit made in Year 1 to Year 5 will be treated as 0 earnings.
A.2 Background Information
[The following Background Information section shows up on every decision page.]
Your Role:
S-Store is open 360 days per year. You are the inventory manager for S-Store. In your
role, you will control S-Stores inventory level which determines the stores total profits.
We now explain how S-Stores, and correspondingly you, earns profit. While we are
explaining how the calculations are made, during the decision tasks the computer will
carry out these calculations and report the results to you.
S-Store sells coffee makers at a price of 7 ECU per unit. S-Store can sell up to 10 coffee
makers per month. A coffee maker can only be sold if there is a unit held in inventory.
If you hold 10 or more units in inventory at the start of the month, S-Store will sell 10
coffee makers that month. However, if there are less than 10 units held in inventory at
the start of the month then S-Store will only sell that amount. For example, if there are
2 units held in inventory at the beginning of a month then S-Store only sells 2 units that
month. [(For EOQ treatment only) You can only place an order when the current months
opening inventory is 0. For example, if the current months opening inventory is 3 units,
you cannot place an order this month, S-Store only sells 3 units this month.] S-Stores
sales revenue for a month is calculated as follows:
Sales revenue = 7 ECU * Number of units sold.
Your job is to manage the stores inventory levels by each month choosing an inventory
order. Prior to the start of each month you can order coffee makers from the supplier to
add to the inventory. Your inventory management determines the S-Stores total costs.
S-Store pays two types of costs. One is the ordering cost. Every time you order a
positive amount you have to pay an order cost. This ordering cost is 45 ECU, and does
not depend upon the size of the order. If you order zero coffee makers then you do not
pay the 45 ECU ordering cost. Holding coffee makers in inventory is costly so S-Store
pays a monthly inventory holding cost. S-Store pays monthly inventory holding cost
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is based on the average number of coffee makers held in inventory multiplied by the per
unit monthly inventory holding cost of 1 ECU. This is calculated as follows:
Inventory holding costs = 1 ECU * (Opening inventory + Order Quantity + Closing
inventory)/2.
Calculation of S-Stores profits
Profits = Sales revenue - Ordering costs - Inventory holding costs
Your monthly earnings are equal to S-Stores monthly profits.
Examples:
1. Alices closing inventory of last month is 20 units, she placed an order of 0 units in
this month.
The demand for each month is 10 units.
She made sales of 10 units.
Her closing inventory of this month is 20− 10 = 10 units.
Her profit in this month is equal to: 7 ∗ 10− 0− 1 ∗ (20 + 0 + 10)/2 = 55.
2. Alices closing inventory of last month is 4 units, she placed an order of 5 units in
this month.
The demand for each month is 10 units.
She only made sales of 9 units. Her closing inventory of this month is 0 units. Her
profit in this month is equal to: 7 ∗ 9− 45− 1 ∗ (4 + 5 + 0)/2 = 13.5.
A.3 Multiple Choice Questions prior to Decision Task
There are a couple of questions for you before the task, please use the information:
The demand for each month is 10 units.
Price of each coffee maker is 7.
Ordering cost is 45 per order.
Monthly inventory holding cost is 1 per unit.
Question 1 of 7
If the inventory level was 5 and you ordered 0 units. How many units will you SELL this
month?
A 0
B 5
C 10
D 15
Question 2 of 7
If the inventory level was 0 and you ordered 15 units. How many units will you SELL
this month?
A 0
B 5
C 10
D 15
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Question 3 of 7
If you made sales of 10 units. What will be your SALES REVENUE this month?
A 0
B 10
C 25
D 70
Question 4 of 7
If you ordered 0 units. What will be your ORDERING COST this month?
A 0
B 1
C 45
D 70
Question 5 of 7
If you ordered 1 unit. What will be your ORDERING COST this month?
A 0
B 1
C 45
D 70
Question 6 of 7
If the inventory level was 0 and you ordered 10 units. You made sales of 10 units. What
will be your HOLDING COST this month?
A 0
B 1
C 5
D 10
Question 7 of 7
If your sales revenue is 70. Your ordering cost is 0 and your holding cost is 10. What will
be your PROFIT this month?
A 15
B 25
C 60
D 70
Figure 7 shows the result page of the multiple choice questions when participants had given
more than 2 incorrect answers. Under such circumstances, they had to raise their hands
to go through incorrectly answered questions with the experimenter in order to obtain a
passcode to proceed to the decision tasks.
A.4 Decision Tasks
Prior to each year’s decision tasks, a mini-instruction page appears. Figure 8 is an
example with PIN task. For treatments with high cognitive loads, the pin page follows
(Figure 9).
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Figure 7: Result Page of the Multiple Choice Questions
An example of the ordering decision page is shown in Figure 10. Participants move the
horizontal bar to enter their decision of order quantity for each month. Order quantities,
costs, and profits of previous months are also displayed on the page. If participants
completed the year’s decision task within 4 minutes, they had to wait until the end of 4
minutes.
They were then prompted to enter the PIN (Figure 11), followed by the end of the year
result page (Figure 12).
Figure 8: Year 4 Instruction
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Figure 9: PIN Page prior to Ordering Page
Figure 10: Ordering Page
Figure 11: Enter the PIN Page
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Figure 12: End of the Year Result Page
B Post-Experimental Survey, Demographics and Sum-
mary Statistics of Participants
Participants were asked to fill a simple questionnaire at the end of the experiment for us
to collect some demographic information.
Figure 13: Post-Experimental Survey
The following are some summary statistics of the participants.
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Table 10: Demographics in Participants
Age (mean) 25.6
Gender (% female) 65%
Education (%Undergraduate) 51%
Figure 14: Distribution of University Programs Participants study
24%
19%
13%
6.4%
37%
Arts & Humanities Engineering & Technology
Life Sciences & Medicine Natural Sciences
Social Sciences & Management
University Faculty of Participants
One can observe that 37% of the participants are from Social Science & Management,
among which they may have training in operations management or have been exposed to
the EOQ model before.
Figure 15: Mathematics levels of participants - self reported
24%
24%
20%
27%
1.9%3.2%
A Levels GCSE
Postgraduate Undergraduate
above Postgraduate below GCSE
Mathematics Level of Participants
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Table 11: Regression on PIN and demographic information
(1) (2)
Annual Profit Annual Profit
Year 1 -129.08∗∗∗ -130.78∗∗∗
(19.30) (18.84)
Year 2 -71.18∗∗∗ -70.65∗∗∗
(16.84) (16.90)
Year 3 -31.00∗∗ -30.90∗∗
(13.76) (13.23)
Year 4 -13.95 -13.74
(12.28) (11.89)
Unrestricted -22.32∗∗ -33.26∗∗∗
(11.22) (12.56)
High·Correct PIN 27.26∗ 19.09
(15.96) (16.13)
Age -2.42∗∗∗
(0.78)
Male 16.14
(11.88)
Postgrad -7.44
(12.40)
STEM 8.66
(13.73)
Math level -5.98
(5.20)
Constant 417.18∗∗∗ 505.75∗∗∗
(15.61) (33.00)
N 385 385
R2 0.18 0.22
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C Possible NW NB sets by month
Table 12: The No worse than and No better than sets for each EOQ cycle by month
Months 2-8
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {1, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {2, 3, 4} NB = {1, 2, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {3} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {3, 4} NB = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {1, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
Month 9
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {2, 3, 4} NB = {1, 2, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {3} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {3, 4} NB = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
Month 10
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {2, 3} NB = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {3} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {2, 3, 4} NB = {1, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
Month 11
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1, 2, 3} NB = {1, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {2} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {2, 3} NB = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4} NB = {4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
Month 12
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {1, 2} NB = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {1, 2, 3} NB = {3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4} NB = {4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
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